There is a remainder of sorts about the Aufhebung -something that needs closer examination. The Aufhebung, for example, is rejected by both Jean-Paul Sartre and his contemporary, Georges Bataille, but for very different reasons. Indeed, a close look at the argument between the two puts the Aufhebung at the center of the discordance. What is at stake, given what Aufhebung seems to promise, is the idea and place of transcendence. Such a notion is rejected by both Bataille and Sartre, at least on the face of it. Sartre because he is a Marxist and existentialist for whom transcendence smacks of religion. Bataille because life must be faced in the horror of the void.
Bataille decides that in one important respect, he is like Baudelaire. Bataille believes that, like the poet, he wants what is understood as impossible: that is, he seeks a simultaneity of contrary experiences -hama, as Derrida reminds us that Aristotle puts it in the Anaximander Fragment. The 'now,' as Derrida continues to note in the voice of Aristotle, cannot coexist with another now. And yet this impossible "co-maintenance of several present nows" (Derrida, 1982: 55) is what Baudelaire can be said to experience, and Bataille can certainly be said to seek. Baudelaire and Bataille will formulate antinomies whose co-existence is by definition impossible and yet irrevocable. They want the antinomies of the dialectic endlessly at discordance. Such a problem of logic is what Derrida (again) will call, with respect to Bataille, a "Hegelianism without reserve." Bataille, Derrida maintains in that essay, is not undergoing "inner experience" (a reference to Bataille's book of the same title) at all, but rather "the 'impossible'" which is a "torment." There is no interior for the subject in Bataille, Derrida continues, because there is no presence, only an impossible. And there is for Bataille no exterior, Derrida continues, except "in the modes of non-relation, secrecy and rupture" (Derrida, 1978: 272) . 2 The attempt to maintain two nows is an impossible possibility whose name, says Derrida, is time. Such a gesture is what largely characterizes Bataille's project, and what often motivates Baudelaire's as well. In both, the historical situation motivates a willed crisis -a rupture -and that crisis is evident in the impossible logic of antimony, or of two simultaneous "nows." Bataille's antimonies continue and exceed (in the disturbing sense of the term) Baudelaire's. Sartre of course, lives in the same historical upheaval as Bataille; but Sartre refuses to enter into the double vision of Baudelaire, or to give credence to Bataille's economy of excess.
The triangulation Baudelaire-Sartre-Bataille, and the disagreements that ensue between the latter two provide, as I have noted, an opportunity for getting at a significant divergence in modernity, a divergence which begins with the Aufhebung and the role of antinomies.
More importantly, however, this divergence marks not only differing notions of transcendence, history, the dialectic and so on. The deviation of opinion between Sartre and Bataille on these issues signals, I will argue, the place where postmodernity begins and takes leave of any modernist, contemporary thought (like Sartre's) that refuses to follow.
Baudelaire
Baudelaire lives in a singular situation. The first modern poet to read the city as text, he inhabits the urban life in the time of high capitalism. The crowds of the city suddenly have a goal (to and from work; what the French call boulot-métro-dodo); Baudelaire as flâneur does not. He stands, in more ways than one, willfully outside the crowd, moving in nonchalant patterns (as against the goal-oriented flow of the crowd), enjoying an anonymity and isolation from the masses. In his essay "Les Foules," (echoing Poe's "The Man of the Crowd" which Baudelaire had just translated), he writes, "Multitude, solitude: equal and convertible terms for the active and productive poet " (1968: 243) .
3 Equal and convertible terms indeed, opposites though they may be.
There are times when Baudelaire revels in such opposites, and plays lustily with what for other mere mortals is open contradiction. "Les Foules" is one such text. Other texts, however, such as "l'Horloge," rail against the contradiction of time, for example, in a manner that insists on its antinomies: time crushes by going slowly: three thousand six hundred times an hour, the second whispers, "Remember." "Je suis Autrefois" says the clock, and adds "Remember" again in English, French and Spanish (its metal throat, says the poet, speaks all languages). Remember, the poet adds, because "the abyss is always thirsty" and "it is too late" (ibid.: 76-77). Both realizations -the hideous slowness of time and, conversely, time's gone-in-a-flash quality -exist simultaneously for the poet; two "nows."
The very impossibility of their co-existence makes for the horror of time, and the force of the poem. (We remember Derrida's point that to attempt maintaining two nows is an impossible possibility whose name is time). In his Journaux intimes Baudelaire writes, "At every moment we are crushed by the idea and sensation of time." And he adds, creating another opposition, "There are only two ways of escaping from this nightmare -in order to forget it: pleasure and work. Pleasure exhausts us. Work strengthens us. Let us choose" (ibid.: 1266).
The problem, however, as the life and texts of Baudelaire attest, is that the presence of two terms preclude choice. They are always, irrevocably, there. Or there is a choice which, as Georges Bataille makes clear, merely reinforces its opposite without annihilating the first term.
There is an opposition in favor of Good, notes Bataille reading the poet, but it is an impossible resolution. He adds that Baudelaire chose God as he did Work, in a completely nominal way, "in order to belong to Satan." Baudelaire could not decide, Bataille continues, "whether the opposition was his own, within himself (between pleasure and work) or external (between God and the devil)." "As a child I felt in my heart two contradictory feelings," writes Baudelaire in a passage that Bataille will cite, "the horror of life," Baudelaire continues, "and the ecstasy of life" (Bataille, 1957: 42 capitalist accumulation" (Bataille, 1957: 44) . For those who, like Baudelaire, do not wish to follow, apathy, passivity and disillusionment (as Lukacs has amply pointed out) seem the inevitable choices.
Baudelaire's poetry posits antinomies not only for compelling personal, biographical reasons, then. The clashing of opposites in his work, the unredeemable (his word)
contradictions that risk explosion at any moment, are (to return to Bataille's words), history pressing in. But where is in? The doubleness which Baudelaire traces in so many of his poems seems to trace as well the emptying out of subjectivity in the face of industrialization.
"Emptying out" such that it is no longer clear where "out" is emptying from. In much of the poetry of Baudelaire, we see "up" and "down" replacing inside and outside. Subjectivity, in other words -at least the subject as he understood himself before revolution -has become a concept all unclear.
The encounter itself in Baudelaire suffers from antinomy -whether it be that with the poor (where the gaze dominates), with beauty (as in "Harmonie du soir"), with the past ("Andromaque, je pense à vous"); with places dreamed of but never attained ("L'invitation au voyage"); even with the divine, as in "Correspondances," where ritual is reinscribed but the accent is on loss. And then there are, as I have noted, the eternal above and the endless below. So, for example, the world is a dictionary of hieroglyphics mirroring the higher realm, but we cannot read the dictionary. The "joy of descent," as Baudelaire puts it, leads to the gouffre (the abyss), le néant (nothingness), le vide (emptiness) -a terrifying vide of bottomless promise.
The point here is not to enter into the infamous binaries that have so motivated deconstructive and other critical theories in the last decades -binaries which, as Levinas has often noted, lead only to changing positions and collapsing the same into the same. On the contrary: my point is to affirm that Baudelaire's oppositions are irredeemable because this is his way of experiencing modernity and its Weltsraum. The strident tension, the mental anguish and cacophony which the presence of two opposing "now's" cause the poet, are frequently described and experienced by him as a need for rupture. "Anywhere out of the world," he pleads in an English title. "I will accept even death if it is something at least new,"
he writes in a prose poem.
If for Walter Benjamin, the Fleurs du mal registers a breakdown, the loss of aura and the ensuing shock, for Baudelaire himself modernity is comprised of the eternal and the fleeting at the same time. One thinks, for example, of the famous poem "A une passante," in which a passing woman in mourning fleetingly meets the poet's gaze (in a moment concretizing epiphany, since it is produced by the illumination of a lightening bolt) (Baudelaire, 1968: 88) .
It is a busy city street, and she is part of the crowd, he is the observing flâneur. The poem ends, famously, with the words, "O toi que j'eusse aimée, ô toi qui le savais!" An always-too-late, because the eternal is never begun, only as if remembered. Halfway between Pascal (with his two infinities) and Kierkegaard (with his notion of trembling), in Baudelaire the poetic subject is overwhelmed by the empty parts of the city under demolition which seem to echo the absence of God, the irrevocability of evil, the resulting failure of encounter.
Contradiction is Baudelaire's duty, and explosive laughter erupts from him, as he puts it, "without a smile." "There is always something which breaks, which destroys itself," he writes in one of his journals. The antinomies are preserved and forced together to the point of atomic fission, for in Baudelaire the contradictions of modernity are inscribed in every Baudelaire, and shown the "puerile" aspect of his attitude (Bataille, 1957: 161) . Sartre thinks
Baudelaire's problems can be explained by the death of his father when the poet was six; by his mother's remarriage to a man Baudelaire loathed; by the ensuing loss of his adored mother. Sartre's book-long introduction to Baudelaire, Bataille notes tersely, is less the work of a critic than it is that of a "moral judge, to whom it is important to know and affirm that Baudelaire is to be condemned" (ibid.: 163). Baudelaire, Sartre has concluded in his judgment, chose to "exist for himself as he was for others." Baudelaire chooses the notion of his own "nature," and after that gives up liberty. He is therefore, in Sartrean terms, he-who-seeks-liberty in a moral, existential universe; he who is condemned to be free. For
Bataille, man is defined by a submission to an interdiction, and the simultaneous insistence 6 "L'Homme ne peut s'aimer jusqu'au bout s'il ne se condamne" (Bataille, 1957: 27 This brings us to the notion of the sacred, which lies at the heart of Sartre's problem with
Bataille. In his later essay on Manet (1955), Bataille gives his definition of the sacred. It is "that which, being only beyond meaning, is more than meaning." What Bataille sees in Manet's paintings is the "shipwreck of the subject" -that moment when subjectivity is killed (Bataille, 1983: 69) . But, as Michel Surya points out in his remarkable biography of Bataille, what interests Bataille is not so much the dead subject as the subject in the process of disappearing. In the words of Surya, the having-been-put-to-death of the subject fascinates Bataille more than its proclaimed death (as that which is finished). Bataille wants a haunting, the liminality of death at its moment of occurrence (Surya, 2002: 471-72) . And so Sartre is right: God subsists as a haunting in Bataille. But Bataille wants this haunting, this ghost of death after death itself; Sartre does not, for he sees in it nothing more than the transcendental returned through the back door.
For Bataille, the force of the sacred, the heterogeneous, is fundamental to all social life.
The "religious" has been largely forgotten and needs by scientific method (the influence here is of course Durkheim) to be reinstated. For Sartre, this is Bataille's biggest error: to imagine studying an unknowable negativity by means of a scientific method, and in the names of Durkheim and Mauss! Durkheim, writes Sartre, is surely rolling over in his grave.
And here perhaps we can get at the heart of the matter. Bataille's notion of the sacred is akin to the vanishing of the subject, to the break as he sees it in representation itself, to the absent-presence (as we used to say) of an already-dead God, to that which can bring being beyond meaning and beyond subjectivity. And Sartre? Significantly, when Sartre calls his book Saint Genet, he is doing more than evoking the play "The True Saint Genet" by Rotrou (1646). As there is a sacred for Bataille, there is sainthood for Sartre. But what is meant by "saint" for Sartre is most revealing. Obviously, he cannot mean it in any but an atheistic sense. By "saint," Sartre means that Genet is a pariah, but one who assumes his exclusion; takes a glorious responsibility for it. Genet behaves against the norm and against convention (that world which Sartre calls that of the salauds).
There lurks a double-edged meaning when Sartre refers to Inner Experience as a "martyr essay." On the one hand, he faults Bataille for a style which has yet to find itself but is rife with agony, hideous passion, narrative promiscuity, and a hatred of discourse. "Look at my ulcers and wounds," the essay seems to say. On the other hand, Bataille is in many ways himself a pariah and, like Genet, against bourgeois norm and convention. Genet, in contrast, is a "saint" for Sartre: he is the pariah, the one who is excluded by society. We note here the opposing symmetry between Sartre and Bataille (though the latter considered Sartre's Saint Genet his greatest work). For Bataille, the sacred is that which is transubjective, which celebrates in fact the disappearance of the subject in a transcendence of silence, as Sartre calls it. For Sartre on the other hand, sainthood is precisely that singularity which, authentic, assumes responsibility for its own history and at the same time chooses (in this case) crime. It is not because Genet was inevitably led to crime that he chooses a life of crime, notes Sartre: pre-determinism, no matter the cause, erases man's 9 But as Surya and others remind us, Bataille frequently published under pseudonyms and felt that his reputation as an archivist of medieval manuscripts at the Bibliothèque Nationale had to be protected. But there are of course also more metaphysical reasons: Bataille wanted to write in order to erase his name. See Surya, 2002: 88-92. liberty and his singularity. Meanwhile, it is precisely such "erasure" that Bataille seeks. This is a fundamental difference in the notion of being between the two. article entitled, as it happens, "The Sacred" (Bataille, 1985) . Despite this dismissive ending, there is a great deal at stake here: Monsieur Bataille, Sartre concludes, introduces the transcendental into the immanent -not a minor point. Two further issues are equally at issue: first, the notion of subjectivity; second, the danger Bataille's universalizing thought poses to historicity. As to the first (the subject), we have noted that for Sartre Bataille's problem is that he understands the ego as an external object, as something that does not belong to the subject. (This is also, one might note, the reproach Sartre makes of the Freudian unconscious). It is worth noting therefore, that we see in Sartre a certain tenacity with respect to the singularity of the individual. As to the second issue, the danger of this kind of mystical thinking, Sartre is clear. Bataille's thought is totalitarian because it is not analytic and because it swallows up history. It is inauthentic because it proclaims the death of God but refuses atheism. Most importantly for our purposes here, Bataille (says Sartre) considers man himself an irresolvable contradiction (Sartre, 1947: 154 With Bataille, the antinomies move dangerously even closer -indeed, one might say that they are forced into confrontation. In Baudelaire, we see the ecstasy of poetry and the abyss of spleen -a stance which produces, as Jean-Pierre Richard has noted, two abysses (the sky and the depths). These are simultaneous, battling forces in the poet's soul. Whereas
Baudelaire vests the clash of antinomies in the poet's psyche, Bataille inscribes contradictory forces on the body. For example, his infamous "pineal eye," the slit on the top of every human's head. This slit is the scopic and mental analog of the anus, and Bataille calls it "the jesuve" (a combination, among other things, of Jesu, Vesuvius, and "Je") (Bataille, 1985: 73-78 * * * * * Bataille's quest for community, for that which puts the subject itself at risk, for rupturethese are aspects of a new thought for Sartre. He understands such thought as a sneaky reinscription of Aufhebung, and rejects it as such. The apparent ease with which Sartre rejects Inner Experience may in fact betray, in light of his subsequent work, a temptation toward the very transcendent tendencies of which he accuses Bataille. To reject the Aufhebung, after all, is a different proposition. In any case, Sartre will maintain (to the end of his life) an ardent belief in human freedom, in the usefulness of language, in human choice, responsibility, and singularity. "Un nouveau mystique," then, may be seen as a seminal text marking the fork in the road between modernism and its heir: a postmodernism impatient with any sovereign subject and suspicious if not dismissive of any notion of human freedom.
